Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional
Requirement for Involuntary Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill
Eight states have recently enacted mental health statutes that
limit involuntary civil commitment to persons who are dangerous
to others or themselves and require a showing that dangerousness
has been manifested in recent conduct.' During the same period
several state and federal courts have held that this overt dangerous
behavior 2 standard is mandated by the Constitution, 3 but some

11975 Ala. Acts 2562, 2566 (Act No. 1226, § 10); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5260,
5300 (West 1972); 1976 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 130, § 1; MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 1
(1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1009 (1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.3 (1974) (repealed 1974);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05020 (1975); 1975 Wis. Laws ch. 430, §§ 51.15, .20. Alabama,
Nebraska, and Wisconsin each enacted a dangerous behavior requirement in response to a
case invalidating a prior statute that lacked such a requirement. See Doremus v. Farrell, 407
F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard
v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded for a more specific
order, 414 U.S. 473, order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976).
1 The courts that have considered an overt dangerous behavior requirement have often
used the language of "overt act." See, e.g., Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa
1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975); United States ex rel. Mathew v.
Nelson, No. 72-C-2104 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 1975), noted in 7 Lov. CHI. L.J. 507 (1976); Lynch
v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.
Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded for a more specific order, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on
remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957
(1975), order reinstatedon remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976); Commonwealth ex rel. Finken
v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. 155, 339 A.2d 764 (1975), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 960 (1974). In a
later order Lessard modified its language to "recent act, attempt or threat." 379 F. Supp. at
1379.
Unfortunately, "overt act" is also a term of art in the criminal law, where it is construed
quite broadly. Very little is required for an "overt act" in a conspiracy prosecution, and the
act itself may be completely innocuous. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). See
generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 476-78 (1972). In addition, the
term "overt act" is confusing because the relevant behavior for civil commitment includes
inchoate conduct such as an attempt or a threat and may also include omissions.
Despite these defects, the case law has adopted the terminology of "overt act," and this
label promises to become a term of art in civil commitment law. This comment employs the
terminology of "overt dangerous behavior" in an effort to avoid the ambiguities and confusing
connotations of "overt act."
3 See, e.g., Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Doremus v. Farrell,
407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell
v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349
F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded for a more specific order, 414 U.S.
473, order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
421 U.S. 957 (1975), orderreinstatedon remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976); Dixon v. Attorney
Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (semble); Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop,
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other courts have expressly rejected such a requirement.' In 1975 the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the standards for
involuntary civil commitment in O'Connor v. Donaldson The
Court left most questions unanswered, however, by its narrow holding that the Constitution does not allow a state to confine a person
in a mental institution against his will if the person is neither dangerous, nor incapable of surviving safely alone or with friends, nor
in need of treatment that requires confinement. The lower courts
that have adopted an overt dangerous behavior requirement have
moved beyond Donaldson by declaring that the Constitution requires a finding of "dangerousness" as a prerequisite to any involuntary confinement of the mentally ill-whether or not treatment is
provided-and by requiring that such a finding be supported by a
tangible item of proof.
This comment considers whether the lower courts have been
justified in making overt dangerous behavior a constitutional prerequisite to involuntary civil commitment. After discussing
Donaldson's potential impact on the permissible grounds for civil
commitment, the comment reviews the cases that have either
adopted or refused to adopt an overt dangerous behavior requirement, examines the definitions of "dangerousness" and "overt dangerous behavior," and analyzes the arguments advanced in the
cases favoring the constitutionalization of an overt dangerous behavior requirement.
I.

O'CONNOR v. DONALDSON: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PERMISSIBLE GROUNDS FOR CIVIL COMMITMENT

The standards and procedures governing involuntary civil commitment in many states seem inconsistent with the concerns for due
process that qualify the criminal justice system. The stigma and loss
of liberty imposed on those who are committed are often barely
distinguishable from the analogous burdens imposed on criminals
and may be even more severe.' Yet many of the substantive and
procedural protections available to alleged criminals have been denied to persons alleged to be mentally ill. The lack of procedural due
234 Pa. Super. 155, 339 A.2d 764, 776-79 (1975) (only three of seven judges agreed on this
point), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 960 (1976).
United States ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson, No. 72-C-2104 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 1975), noted
in 7 Loy. CHI. L.J. 507 (1976); People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974);
In re Salem, 31 N.C. App. 57, 228 S.E.2d 649 (1976).
5 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
6 See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv.
L. REv. 1190, 1193-201 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Civil Commitment].
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process in civil commitment has received increasing attention from
courts and commentators. 7 Similarly, the phenomenon this comment examines-the recent interest of both legislatures and lower
courts in an overt dangerous behavior requirement-indicates a
growing concern that the standards for civil commitment do not
satisfy the mandates of substantive due process.
Unlike the criminal law, which is based on a retributiondeterrence approach,8 the law of civil commitment is built around
a prediction-prevention model A person may be sent to prison for
a criminal offense only after being convicted of having committed
the particular offense, and the term of imprisonment is fixed in
relationship to the offense.1 0 On the other hand, in many states a
person may be committed against his will to a mental institution
for an indeterminate period on a psychiatrist's testimony that he is
"mentally ill" and a prediction that if he remains free he will be
"dangerous" to himself or others, or a certification that he is in need
of care, custody, or treatment.'
These substantive differences between civil commitment and
the criminal justice system are frequently explained by pointing out
the distinctive purposes of civil commitment. States have traditionally based their authority to commit the mentally ill on two sources:
the parens patriae power, which can be traced back to the sovereign's responsibility to protect the properties of a subject who was
incompetent to handle his own affairs,' 2 and the police power, by
which the state seeks to protect other citizens from a person whose
mental condition renders him "dangerous."'' 3 These traditional pow' See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1090-93, 1097-103 (E.D. Wis. 1972),
vacated and remanded for more specific order, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp.
1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order
reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 6, at 1265-1316.
The criminal justice system contains elements of the prediction-prevention approach
as well as the retribution-deterrence approach, but the basic thrust of the system is clearly
the latter. See generally Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness:Some Fictions About
Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 24, 27-32 (1970).
1 Dershowitz, supra note 8, at 32-47.
"0 There are exceptions to this generalization, the most important of which are the
practices classified as "preventive detention." See Dershowitz, supra note 8, at 29-32; Foote,
Comments on Preventive Detention, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 48 (1970).
" See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 36-41, 66-71, 9195 (rev. ed. S. Brakel & R. Rock 1971); Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 6, at
1201-07.
2 See generally Dershowitz, supra note 8,at 33-35; Ross, Commitment of the Mentally
Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REv. 945, 956-60 (1959); Developments-Civil
Commitment, supra note 6, at 1207-22.
" See generally Ross, supra note 12, at 955-56; Developments-Civil Commitment, supra
note 6, at 1222-45.
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ers provide the foundations for the most common current justifications for involuntary civil commitment: protecting other persons
from being harmed by a person whose condition makes him unable
to respond to the normal social and legal sanctions against violent
behavior, preventing the mentally ill person from harming himself,
providing a minimum of care and custody for those unable to survive safely in freedom, and providing treatment for those unable to
make responsible treatment decisions for themselves. 4
The criminal justice approach, based on deterring antisocial
actions by establishing punitive sanctions designed to affect the
conscious decisions of responsible individuals, is said to be inappropriate in a context where individuals are regarded as incapable of
responding to "normal" incentives and thus not responsible for their
actions. 15 Furthermore, when the state is acting in a beneficent capacity (under the parens patriaepower), rather than a punitive one,
substantive and procedural protections are supposedly less necessary. 6 Moreover, a prediction-prevention approach, focusing on and
limited by the treatment of a disease rather than retribution or
'1 Statutes, courts, and commentators have formulated these aims differently and have
at times combined or confused them. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972);
Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520-21 (5th Cir. 1974), remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975);
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 38 (rev. ed. S. Brakel & R.

Rock 1971); Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justificationsfor Civil Commitment,
117 U. PA. L. REv. 75 (1968); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and
Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1288, 1289-97 (1966); Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment,
53 VA. L. REv. 1134, 1138-39 (1967). Prevention of dangerousness to self is a hybrid goal that
is outside the strict formulation of either the police power or the parenspatriae power, but
partakes of elements of both. See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 521 (5th Cir. 1974),
remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra, 1293-95.
Courts and commentators have also mentioned some other explanations for civil commitment that lack the legitimacy of the more widely recognized goals. These include the desire
to protect others from the embarrassment of being exposed to mentally ill persons, the desire
to assure that the mentally ill maintain a minimum living standard, and the inability of those
who are classified as mentally ill to defend themselves effectively against assaults on their
liberty. See generally Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, supra; Slovenko, Civil Commitment
in Perspective, 20 J. PUB. L. 3 (1971). The Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563 (1975), in effect rejected all but the traditionally recognized justifications for involuntary commitment. See text and notes at notes 21-34 infra.
11This rationale is logically limited to commitments of persons whose mental condition
would qualify them for an insanity defense in a criminal prosecution for the acts they are
predicted to commit. See Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, supra note 14, at 86.
" The most significant example of this rationalization is the "quid pro quo" theory used
by some to justify a "right to treatment." According to this argument, lower procedural and
substantive protections are counterbalanced by the "benefit" conferred by a right to receive
treatment. See, e.g., Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 521-22 (5th Cir. 1974), remanded,
422 U.S. 563 (1975). The quid pro quo theory has been criticized as a dangerous concept that
might undercut valuable due process protections by justifying one deprivation of liberty
(commitment) by a further deprivation of liberty (compulsory treatment). See, e.g.,
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 585-87, 589 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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deterrence, resembles the approach doctors normally follow in dealing with nonmental illnesses.
Despite these historical and theoretical distinctions, the obvious similarities between the practical effects of civil commitment
and of criminal conviction have led some commentators to question
the differences between the substantive standards that apply in the
two situations.' 7 The police power rationale authorizes commitments that are no more "beneficent" than sentences given to convicted criminals, and medical science's limited understanding of
mental illnesses weakens the appeal of a theory of compulsory
"treatment.' 8 Some commentators have even asserted that civil
commitment has provided society with an insidious method of evading the constitutional requirements of due process while depriving
a powerless minority of their liberty. 9
The Supreme Court has dealt indirectly with similar questions
about the standards for civil commitment in several cases involving
the commitment of persons accused of criminal activity, 20 but the
,7 See Dershowitz, supra note 8, at 32-47; Foote, supranote 10.
In spite of medical science's relative ignorance about mental illness, compulsory treatment of the mentally ill is supposedly justified because mentally ill persons are incapable of
making a rational choice whether to undergo treatment. This rationale can become circular
if a refusal to undergo treatment is considered as evidence of irrationality. See Livermore,
Malmquist & Meehl, supra note 14, at 88 n.36; Developments-Civil Commitment, supra
note 6, at 1212-19.
"1 See, e.g., Foote, supra note 10; Frankel, Comments on Preventive Detention, 23 J.
LEGAL

ED. 53 (1970).

10 See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107 (1966); Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956). The Supreme Court has generally proceeded cautiously when considering the standards for involuntary civil commitment.
In Greenwood the Court upheld the authority of the United States under 18 U.S.C. § § 42444248 (1970) to commit a person indicted for a federal crime who was found to be incompetent
to stand trial and likely to "endanger the officers, property, or other interests of the United
States" if released. 350 U.S. at 375. Justice Frankfurter, writing for a unanimous Court,
limited his holding to sustaining only the initial commitment of the prisoner, and expressly
denied deciding more than the specific situation presented or implying "an opinion on situations not now before us." Id. at 376. Greenwood is the only case in which the Court has
squarely upheld a government's authority to commit a mentally ill or defective person against
his will.
In the cases following Greenwood the Court has invalidated what amounted to commitments of persons charged with or convicted of crimes when these persons had been denied
the substantive or procedural protections afforded under state statutory provisions governing
,civil commitment. These cases have usually relied on the equal protection clause, though at
least one case also reached the due process issue. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 73139 (1972). Some of these cases contain dicta interpreting state statutes to require a finding
of dangerousness and suggesting that this interpretation is mandated by constitutional concerns. See id. at 728, 737; Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (Wisconsin statute
"conditions such confinement not solely on the medical judgment that the defendant is
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Court did not directly address the standards for involuntary civil
commitment outside the criminal context until its 1975 opinion in
O'Connor v. Donaldson.21 Kenneth Donaldson was involuntarily
confined in a mental institution for nearly fifteen years although he
posed no danger to others and was not thought likely to inflict injury
on himself.22 Had he been permitted to live outside the institution,
responsible friends were willing to provide any care he might have
needed.2 During his confinement he received only custodial care
and no treatment. 24 After several unsuccessful attempts to secure
his release,2 5 Donaldson brought a suit seeking his freedom and
damages against those responsible for his continued confinement. A
jury found that Donaldson's constitutional right to liberty had been
violated and awarded him compensatory and punitive damages.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that under the circumstances
Donaldson had been deprived of a constitutional right to treatment
and stating that whenever a mentally ill person is civilly committed
against his will he has "a constitutional right to receive such treatment as will give him a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to
'2
improve his mental condition.
The Supreme Court agreed that Donaldson's confinement was
unconstitutional, but found that the right-to-treatment issue was
"not presented by this case in its present posture"2 and took pains
to frame its holding very narrowly. Following a barely articulated
due process interest-balancing approach, the Court held that none
of the state interests involved in Donaldson's case had justified the
deprivation of his liberty by continued confinement. After declaring
mentally ill and treatable, but also on the social and legal judgment that his potential for
doing harm, to himself or to others, is great enough to justify such a massive curtailment of
liberty").
21422 U.S. 563 (1975), noted in Note, "Without More": A Constitutional Right to
Treatment, 22 Loy. L. REv. 373 (1976); Note, Supreme Court Sidesteps the Right to
Treatment Question, 47 U. COLO. L. Rv.299 (1976); 9 AKRON L. REv. 374 (1975); 13 CAL.
WEST. L. Rav. 168 (1976); 24 CLEV. ST. L. lav. 557 (1975); 7 CoLUm. HuMAN RIGHTS L. Rav.
573 (1975); 3 HAST. CoNST. L.Q. 599 (1976); 4 HoFSTRA L. REV. 511 (1976); 53 J. URBAN L.
305 (1975); 37 MONT.L. REv. 227 (1976); 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 174 (1975); 3 OHfo N.U.L. REv.
550 (1975); 29 OKLA. L. REv. 117 (1976); 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 76 (1975); 43 TENN. L. REv.
366 (1976); 50 TULANE L. REV. 699 (1976); 10 U. RICH. L. REv. 402 (1976); 51 WASH. L. REv.
733 (1976).
" 422 U.S. at 568.
21Id. at 568-69.
21 Id. at 569. During his confinement Donaldson may have at times refused certain types
of treatment on religious grounds. Id. at 569 n.4; Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 511
(5th Cir. 1974).
See, e.g., Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 515-17 (5th Cir. 1974).
21 Id. at 527.
422 U.S. at 573.
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that a mere finding of mental illness provides no constitutional basis
for confinement, the Court proceeded to dismiss two other possible
justifications for Donaldson's confinement. The state's interest in
ensuring that the mentally ill are provided with care and assistance
to maintain a certain minimum living standard was insufficient
because "the mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify a
person from preferring his home to the comforts of an institution. 2 8
The state's interest in protecting other citizens from exposure to the
mentally ill was also too weak: "public intolerance or animosity
cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical
liberty.""9
Finding that the state interests actually present in Donaldson's
case did not justify his confinement, the Court expressly disclaimed
deciding
whether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally ill person
may be confined by the State on any of the grounds which,
under contemporary statutes, are generally advanced to justify
involuntary confinement of such a person-to prevent injury to
the public, to ensure his own survival or safety, or to alleviate
30
or cure his illness.
None of these "generally advanced" grounds was available to justify
Donaldson's confinement. His confinement could not be sustained
as preventing injury to the public because he was not dangerous.
Nor could it be sustained as ensuring his own safety because he was
not suicidal or likely to inflict injury on himself and would be able
to live safely in freedom. Finally, his confinement could not be
justified as alleviating or curing his illness because no treatment
had been provided.
Construed narrowly, Donaldson is an unsurprising holding: involuntary confinement of the mentally ill is impermissible when
none of the generally accepted grounds is present. The opinion indicates that at least a finding of dangerousness or incapacity to survive in freedom is necessary when no treatment is provided, but the
Court did not define "dangerousness" with any specificity or decide
whether a finding of dangerousness is always necessary-or sufficient 3 -for commitment. The Court also sidestepped the difficult
21

Id. at 575.

29

Id.

Id. at 573-74.
On the sufficiency of dangerousness as a ground for civil commitment, see Greenwood
v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956), discussed in note 20 supra, where the Court upheld a
commitment based in part on a finding of dangerousness to the "officers, property, or other
"
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issues of what evidence is required to establish dangerousness (e.g.,
whether overt dangerous behavior must be proved) and what can
count as "treatment." The defendants did not contradict the testimony that Donaldson was not dangerous, 32 and the Court relied on
the jury's verdict "based on abundant evidence" that Donaldson
had received no treatment."
The Donaldson opinion thus leaves the Supreme Court with
maximum flexibility, and the lower courts with minimal directions,
on these issues in future cases. Nevertheless, the opinion does provide a guide to how purported justifications for involuntary civil
commitment should be evaluated-by employing due process interest balancing supplemented with a least restrictive means
test 34-and perhaps implies that the three "generally advanced"
justifications will weigh more heavily in the balance against the
individual's liberty interest than did the state interests present in
Donaldson.
II.

LOWER COURT CASES DEALING WITH AN OVERT DANGEROUS
BEHAVIOR REQUIREMENT

The lower courts both before and after Donaldson have shown
less restraint in addressing whether the Constitution requires that
a person be found "dangerous" before he can be subjected to involuntary civil commitment, and, if so, whether the evidence of such
"dangerousness" must include proof of overt dangerous behavior.
The decisions considering these issues have reached mixed results,
and the depth of their analyses is limited, but they do articulate the
major arguments for and against an overt dangerous behavior requirement.
The leading case adopting an overt dangerous behavior requirement is Lessard v. Schmidt,3 5 a 1972 decision in which a three-judge
interests of the United States." Later cases have followed the Court's suggestion in
Greenwood that the holding of the case be limited to its particular facts. See Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731-33, 737 (1972).
422 U.S. at 568.
Id. at 573.
" The Court indicated its concern that the least restrictive means be used when it
discussed the state's interest in ensuring a minimum living standard for the mentally ill:
"[Wihile the State may arguably confine a person to save him from harm, incarceration is
rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising the living standards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom, on their own or with the help of family or friends. See Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 488-490 [(1960)1."
3 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded for a more specific order,
414 U.S. 743, order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstatedon remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976).
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federal district court considered allegations that the Wisconsin civil
commitment statute ignored less drastic alternatives and was vague
and overbroad. The court was able to construe the statute so that
it was not impermissibly vague or overbroad by reading in an implicit requirement that the person to be committed be found
"dangerous." 3 6 The court balanced the individual's interest against
the state's and concluded that involuntary commitment is constitutionally justified only if there is an "extreme likelihood that if the
person is not confined he will do immediate harm to himself or
others. '3 The court then commented on how this "extreme likelihood" might be proved:
Although attempts to predict future conduct are always difficult, and confinement based upon such a prediction must always be viewed with suspicion, we believe civil confinement
can be justified in some cases if the proper burden of proof is
satisified and dangerousness is based upon a finding of a recent
overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm to oneself
38
or another.
The court evidently regarded overt dangerous behavior as necessary
to establish a sufficiently high probability of harm. 39 Lessard'sholding has been put in some doubt, as the Supreme Court has twice
vacated the case on other grounds." The court has since reinstated
its order 4 and the issue is now moot because Wisconsin has enacted
2
a new statute that requires overt dangerous behavior.
11 Id.
3Id.

at 1093.

Id. (citing Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (requiring a "high
probability of serious harm" for commitment under a sexually dangerous offenders statute)).
3' The court supported its requirement of proof of dangerousness by comparing mentally
ill persons to physically ill persons, who are allowed to choose whether to undergo treatment.
The court conceded that a difference might be justified where a state could prove "that the
person is unable to make a decision about hospitalization because of the nature of his illness."
Id. at 1094. Nevertheless, pointing out the generally recognized ambiguity of any definition
of "mental illness," the court asserted that
it is not difficult to see that the rational choice in many instances would be to forego
treatment, particularly if it carries with it the stigma of incarceration in a mental
institution, with the difficulties of obtaining release, the curtailments of many rights,
the interruption of job and family life, and the difficulties of attempting to obtain a job,
drivers license, etc. upon release from the hospital.
Id. The court also held that "the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all facts
necessary to show that an individual is mentally ill and dangerous," id. at 1095, and must
demonstrate that confinement is the least restrictive alternative. Id. at 1095-96.
,0 414 U.S. 743 (1974); 421 U.S. 957 (1975).
1, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
11 1975 Wis. LAws ch. 430, §§ 51.15(1), 51.20(1)(a) (text of statute may be found at note
77 infra).
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In the earlier case of Dixon v. Attorney General4J3 a three-judge
court found Pennsylvania's mental health statute to be "almost
completely devoid of the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment."44 The consent decree included a standard for
commitment: "[Tihe evidence found to be reliable by the factfinder must establish clearly, unequivocally and convincingly that
the subject of the hearing requires commitment because of manifest
indications that the subject poses a present threat of serious physical harm to other persons or to himself."45 Although "manifest indications" could be interpreted to require only behavior that supports
a diagnosis that an individual is in a category of persons who will
probably harm others or himself, the court probably intended a
standard similar to that in Lessard."
Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital47 involved a vagueness
attack on Michigan's statute. The court held that without a showing
of dangerousness the statute was impermissibly vague and noted
that in order "to validate the 'massive curtailment of liberty' which
involuntary commitment occasions, the basis for confinement must
be in threatened or actual behavior stemming from the mental disorder, and of a nature which the state may legitimately control, viz.,
that causing harm to self or others. 48 The court's language is ambiguous, as "threatened" behavior could be read to include any
prediction of dangerous behavior. The court's order was limited to
requiring dangerousness and did not mention an overt dangerous
49
behavior requirement to implement the dangerousness standard.
Lynch v. Baxley" involved a challenge to Alabama's mental
health statute. The federal court mandated minimum due process
safeguards and held that involuntary commitment must be based
on dangerousness.- Relying on Lessard, the court went on to require
overt dangerous behavior. The court characterized the issue as one
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and then reasoned:
A mere expectancy that danger-productive behavior might be
engaged in does not rise to the level of legal significance when
13 325

F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).

" Id. at 972.

Id. at 974.
See Developments- Civil Commitment, supra note 6, at 1206.
' 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
Id. at 1096 (emphasis added) (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)).
384 F. Supp. at 1102. The plaintiffs had also argued that commitment under the
current statute was an unconstitutional punishment for status. Id. at 1095.
386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
1 Id. at 389-91.
'
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the consequence of such an evaluation is involuntary confinement. To confine a citizen against his will because he is likely
to be dangerous in the future, it must be shown that he has
actually been dangerous in the recent past and that such danor threat to do
ger was manifested by an overt act, attempt
52
substantial harm to himself or to another.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop53 the Pennsylvania
Superior Court declared a provision of Pennsylvania's mental
health statute unconstitutionally vague and held that both dangerousness and evidence of overt dangerous behavior were required for
commitment:
In light of the difficulty of predicting that a given mental
state is likely to result in future antisocial conduct, it seems
necessary to require the commission of some overt act. When
coupled with psychiatric evaluation, the court will then be in
a better position to assess the likelihood of the individual committing similar acts. The court should not order commitment
unless it is convinced that the probability of such acts occurring is substantial.54
Nebraska's involuntary commitment statute was found unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in Doremus v. Farrell.5 The court
reasoned that dangerousness is required because the state must
have a compelling interest in confinement, 56 and implemented the
dangerousness standard with an overt dangerous behavior requirement:
Due process and equal protection require that the standards for
commitment must be (a) that the person is mentally ill and
poses a serious threat of substantial harm to himself or to others; and (b) that this threat of harm has been evidenced by a
recent overt act or threat. The threat of harm to oneself may
57
be through neglect or inability to care for oneself.
In Stamus v. Leonhardt 8 a federal district court relied on
Id. at 391.
234 Pa. Super. 155, 339 A.2d 764 (1975), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 960 (1976). Finken
involved a challenge to a different provision of the mental health statute from Dixon v.
Attorney Gen., 229 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971), where a federal court found the relevant
provision of Pennsylvania's statute unconstitutional.
' 234 Pa. Super. 155, 183-84, 339 A.2d at 778-79.
407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975).
5 Id. at 514.
5 Id. at 514-15.
414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976).
"
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Doremus to hold Iowa's involuntary commitment statute impermissibly vague. The court quoted Doremus at length and then announced, "This court therefore holds that the commitment standards . . .violated substantive due process by not requiring that
subjects pose a serious threat to themselves or others, as evidenced
by a recent overt act, attempt or threat."5 9 However, in a numbered
statement of conclusions the court failed to mention an overt dangerous behavior requirement."
Thus, several cases have espoused an overt behavior requirement, and these cases have suggested several different rationales.
But for the most part the courts have failed to either articulate
clearly or analyze fully the rationale for the requirement. The principal holding of each case is that involuntary commitment is justified only when an individual is dangerous. The courts have then
required that overt behavior evidence the individual's dangerousness. The courts have in other words made dangerousness the standard for commitment and then required overt behavior as a means
of proving dangerousness.
Several courts have refused to adopt an overt dangerous behavior requirement. In People v. Sansone the Illinois appellate court
considered a contention that "in the absence of proof of prior dangerous behavior, civil commitment is preventive detention, and violative of due process." 6 ' The court distinguished criminal punishment from detention based on a law that requires treatment and
held that commitment was not punishment for status.6 2 The due
process argumdnt was also rejected: "Due process does not require
that a person be charged with a specific dangerous overt act, but
that there be a nexus between the facts asserted and a finding of

'in need of treatment.'

"63

In United States ex rel. Matthew v. Nelson 4 a three-judge federal district court considered another attack on the Illinois commitment statute. Because the Illinois statute requires dangerousness,
the court faced only the question whether overt dangerous behavior
was constitutionally necessary. The court was presented with conflicting expert testimony regarding the reliability of predictions of
dangerousness in the absence of overt behavior. In light of this testiId. at 451.
"Id. at 453.
" 18 Ill.
App. 3d
'= Id. at 324, 309
Id. at 324, 309
11No. 72-C-2104
"

315, 317, 309 N.E.2d 733, 735 (1974).
N.E.2d at 739.
N.E.2d at 740.
(N.D. IL. Aug. 18, 1975), noted in 7 Loy.

CHI.

L.J. 507 (1976).
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mony, the court held that the state could rationally choose to predict dangerousness without an overt act. 5 The court feared the consequences of an overt dangerous behavior requirement:
There must always be a first dangerous act in any series of
dangerous acts [of] a mentally ill person, and the due process
clause does not render the state powerless to protect against
that first dangerous act provided it establishes a test for determining dangerousness that is based on a rational appraisal of
the scientific knowledge that is available. 6
For a brief period North Carolina's statute required an "overt
act" of dangerousness to support commitment." A 1974 amendment
repealed the overt act requirement but increased the requisite burden of persuasion to "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" of
dangerousness. In re Salem 9 was a challenge to the amended statute. The plaintiffs, relying on Lessard, argued that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague and asked the court to read back into the
statute an overt dangerous behavior requirement, but the North
Carolina Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that the overt act
standard was only one rational means of providing adequate evidence of dangerousness.
III.

A.

ANALYSIS OF THE OVERT DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR REQUIREMENT

Preliminary Issues

Before examining the rationales employed by the courts that
have required proof of overt dangerous behavior as a constitutional
prerequisite to involuntary civil commitment, it is necessary to consider several fundamental definitions and assumptions that underlie those rationales. These preliminary issues include the definitions
of "dangerousness" and "overt dangerous behavior" and the questions whether "dangerousness" is a constitutional prerequisite to
involuntary commitment and whether predictions of future danger"Id.
6

Id. The vagueness challenge was also rejected, in part because of the practical impossi-

bility of specifying the types of conduct that might lead to confinement. The argument that
commitment constituted punishment for status was summarily disapproved.
One judge dissented, arguing that the prediction of violent behavior should be accompanied by a prior overt act. The dissent did not extend this reasoning to commitments based
on an inability to survive in freedom.
67 N.C. GEN. STATS. § 122-58.3 (1974) (repealed 1974).
" 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1408.
66 228 S.E.2d 649 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
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ousness are substantially more accurate if based on recent overt
dangerous behavior.
1. Dangerousness. The definition of "dangerousness" is obviously crucial to any consideration of whether dangerousness or
overt dangerous behavior is required for involuntary civil commitment. Yet defining "dangerousness," like defining "mental illness,"
has proven difficult for both courts and legislatures. Someone who
is "dangerous" is likely to inflict harm, but the term "dangerous"
by itself does not define the probability, object, or nature of the
harm." For example, a person might be very likely or only marginally likely to do harm. The danger might be imminent or merely a
long-term probability. The object of the harm might be the person
himself, other persons, his own property, or the property of others.
The harm might involve various gradations of physical or psychological damage; it might result from the person's actions or his failure
to act. All these dimensions of "dangerousness" are potentially relevant to whether a person is so "dangerous" that the state would be
justified in committing him. Developing a less complicated definition of "dangerousness" that excludes or ignores any of these dimensions is problematic because the significance of any one factor (e.g.,
the type of harm) may depend on the other factors (e.g., the magnitude or probability of harm). For instance, the definition could be
made nonspecific by limiting "dangerousness" to the likelihood of
doing physical harm to persons; but a state might claim to have a
greater interest in preventing extensive property damage that is
highly probable than in preventing mild physical injuries that are
only marginally probable.
Despite this difficulty, some courts and legislatures have attempted to make the term "dangerousness" less ambiguous by specifying the degree of probability and the type and magnitude of harm
that they consider necessary to justify confining a mentally ill person against his will. The Donaldson Court's list of the "generally
accepted" grounds for involuntary confinement of the mentally
ill-"to prevent injury to the public, to insure the committed individual's own survival or safety, or to alleviate or cure his illness" 71-suggests at least three types of dangers: (1) injufry to others,
(2) active injury to self (e.g., suicide), and (3) passive injury to self
(e.g., neglect). The Court did not mention injury to property (unless
70

See generally A. BROOKS, LAW,

PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 680-82

(1974); Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, supra note 14, at 81-83; Note, Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures,79 H-Iv.L. Rv.1288, 1289-95 (1966).
11422 U.S. at 573-74.
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this is subsumed under injury to the public) and did not distinguish
between physical and psychological injury. Nor did the Court specify how substantial the injury must be, though by rejecting the
state's interest in guaranteeing the mentally ill a minimum living
standard and by distinguishing between dangerousness to self and
the need for treatment the Court did imply that the potential injury
to the individual himself must be rather substantial. 72 In contrast
the Lessard court required "extreme likelihood that if the person is
not confined he will do immediate harm to himself or others," and
suggested that the potential harm must be "substantial. 73 Hawaii's
statute provides a further comparison; the statute requires a
substantial risk of physical or emotional injury to another or of
physical injury to self or an attempt or threat imminently to damage
property in a way that would constitute a crime.74 Hawaii's statute,
however, has been held to violate due process by75allowing dangerousness to property as a ground for commitment.
Such general definitions of dangerousness are given further content by the nature of the evidence required to support a finding that
a person is dangerous. The courts and legislatures that have required overt dangerous behavior to prove "dangerousness" have in
effect supplemented their definitions of dangerousness by requiring
that any predictions of future dangerousness be based on certain
types of past behavior.
2. Overt Dangerous Behavior. There is no case law holding
that a particular act does or does not constitute overt dangerous
behavior, because the cases that have required the standard have
all involved broad remedial orders that were not limited to the facts
of a particular case.7" The cases therefore offer at best only general
71 Id. at 575-76.
73 349 F. Supp. at 1093.
71 1976 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 130, § 1. See note 77 infra.
7- Suzuki v. Yuen, 46 U.S.L.W. 2181 (D.Hawaii Sept. 26, 1977).
7, The leading case is typical. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972),

vacated and remanded for a more specific order, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on remand, 379
F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order
reinstatedon rqmand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976), was a class action, which declared Wisconsin's statute unconstitutional fdr failing to provide all persons undergoing mental commitment procedures with written and oral notice informing them of the factual basis for their
detention, their right to a jury trial, the standards upon which they may be detained, the
names of examining physicians and all persons who may testify in favoi of their continued
detention, and a summary of the proposed testimony of those who may testify in favor of their
commitment. Within 48 hours a judicial hearing is required to determine whether or not
probable cause exists to believe these persons are both mentally ill and dangerous to themselves or others. For this hearing, counsel must be appointed sufficiently in advance to
adequately prepare a defense; the person detained and members of his family who can be
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definitions of overt dangerous behavior. The statutes, although far
from uniform, that require overt dangerous behavior offer more detailed definitions, but significant ambiguities remain.77 Neverthelocated with reasonable diligence must be given notice; and the person detained has a nonwaivable right to be present and an opportunity to be heard. Persons detained must be
informed of their right against self-incrimination. Within 14 days a full hearing on the necessity for commitment is required at which the person detained has the right to be represented
by counsel and to be appointed counsel if indigent. The hearing must apply the rules of
evidence including the hearsay rule. The privilege against self-incrimination will attach to
psychiatric and other expert evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the person
detained is both mentally ill and dangerous is also required. The finding of dangerousness
must be based on a recent act, attempt, or threat to do substantial harm. Before commitment
all available less drastic alternatives to commitment must have been investigated and found
beyond a reasonable doubt to be unsuitable. 379 F. Supp. 1376, 1378-79 (E.D. Wis. 1974)
(order on remand), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order
reinstatedon remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976).
7 If at the final hearing upon a petition seeking to commit a person to the custody
of the State Department of Mental Health, the probate judge on the basis of substantial
evidence shall find:
1. that the persons [sic] sought to be committed is mentally ill; and
2. that as a consequence of the mental illness the person poses a real and present
threat of substantial harm to himself or to others; and
3. that the threat of substantial harm has been evidenced by a recent overt act;
and
4. that treatment is available for the person's mental illness or that confinement
is necessary to prevent the person from causing substantial harm to himself or to others;
and
5. the probate judge shall enter an order setting forth his findings, granting the
petition and ordering the person committed to the custody of the Alabama State Department of Mental Health.
1975 Ala. Acts 2562, 2566 (Act No. 1226, § 10).
At the expiration of the 14-day period of intensive treatment any person who [has
a] mental disorder. . .and who continues to present an imminent threat of taking his
own life, may be confined for further intensive treatment pursuant to this article for an
additional period not to exceed 14 days.
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE

§

5260 (West 1972).

At the expiration of the 14-day period of intensive treatment, a person may be confined
for further treatment pursuant to the provisions of this article for an addditional period,
not to exceed 90 days if he:
(a) Has threatened, attempted, or inflicted physical harm upon the person of
another . . . and . . . as a result of mental disorder, presents an imminent threat of

substantial physical harm to others. ...
Id. at § 5300.
"Dangerous to others" means likely to do substantial physical or emotional injury
on another, as evidenced by a recent act, attempt or threat.
"Dangerous to self" means likely to do substantial physical injury to one's self, as
evidenced by a recent act, attempt or threat to injure one's self physically or by neglect
or refusal to take necessary care for one's own physical health and safety together with
incompetence to determine whether treatment for mental illness or substance abuse is
appropriate.
"Dangerous to property," in the context of an emergency admission, means inflicting, attempting or threatening imminently to inflict damage to any property in a manner
which constitutes a crime, as evidenced by a recent act, attempt or threat.
1976 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 130, § 1. Dangerousness to property, however, was held not to
be a constitutional basis for commitment. Suzuki v. Yuen, 46 U.S.L.W. 2181 (D. Hawaii Sept.
26, 1977).

578
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less, the statutes and cases are in accord on most important points,78
"Likelihood of serious harm," (1) a substantial risk of physical harm to the person
himself as manifested by evidence of threats of, or attempts at, suicide or serious bodily
harm; (2) a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by evidence
of homicidal or other violent behavior or evidence that others are placed in reasonable
fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm to them; or (3) a very substantial risk
of physical impairment or injury to the person himself as manifested by evidence that
such person's judgment is so affected that he is unable to protect himself in the community and that reasonable provision for his protection is not available in the community.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 1 (West 1972).
Mentally ill dangerous person shall mean any mentally ill person who presents:
(1) A substantial risk of serious harm to another person or persons within the near
future, as manifested by evidence of recent violent acts or threats of violence or by
placing others in reasonable fear of such harm; or
(2) A substantial risk of serious harm to himself within the near future, as manifested by evidence of recent attempts at, or threats of, suicide or serious bodily harm,
or evidence of inability to provide for his basic human needs, including food, clothing,
shelter, essential medical care, or personal safety.
NEB. Rav. STAT. § 83-1009 (1976).

Any person who, by reason of the commission of overt acts, is determined by a
qualified physician to be violent and of imminent danger to himself or others, or to be
gravely disabled, may be taken into custody by a law-enforcement officer as authorized
by this section. Authorization may be given by any qualified physician in the form of a
written statement that he has made a personal examination of the person within 24 hours
of the date of his statement and that it is his professional opinion, based upon such
examination, that the person is violent and of imminent danger to himself or others, or
is gravely disabled. The written statement of the qualified physician must specify the
overt acts upon which his professional opinion is based.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.3 (1974) (repealed 1974).
A law enforcement officer may take an individual into custody for up to 48 hours,
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays, if he or she has cause to believe that
such individual is mentally ill, is a drug dependent, or is developmentally disabled, and
the individual exhibits conduct which constitutes a substantial risk of physical harm to
the individual or to others. The officer's belief shall be based on specific and recent acts,
attempts or threats to act made by the subject individual as observed by the officer or
by other persons.
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 51.15(1) (West Supp. 1977) (emergency detention).
Every written petition for examination shall allege that the subject individual to be
examined:
1. Is mentally ill, drug dependent, or developmentally disabled and is a proper
subject for treatment; and either
2. Is dangerous because of:
a. A substantial risk of physical harm to the subject individual as manifested by
evidence of recent threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm; or
b. A substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by evidence
of recent homicidal or other violent behavior, or by evidence that others are placed in
reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm to them, as evidenced by
a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do such physical harm; or
3. Evidences a very substantial risk of physical impairment or injury to the subject
individual, as manifested by evidence that his or her judgment is so affected that he or
she is unable to protect himself or herself in the community and that reasonable provision for his or her protection is not available in the community and the individual is not
appropriate for placement under § 55.06. The subject individual's status as a minor does
not automatically establish dangerousness under this subparagraph.
Id. § 51.20 (1) (a) (involuntary commitment for treatment).
18One statute provides a significantly broader range of dangerousness by allowing that
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so it is possible to construct a general definition of overt dangerous
behavior.
Overt dangerous behavior is behavior that could reasonably be
regarded as presenting a risk of substantial physical harm to others
or to the actor, or as demonstrating an inability to survive in freedom. Dangerousness depends not on whether a person intends to
cause harm but on whether others might reasonably regard his behavior as likely to cause harm. The behavior need not be a completed act. An attempt or threat, or even a failure to act may suffice.
Further, the cases and statutes have implied that the behavior itself
must be dangerous, not simply some evidence to support a finding
of dangerousness. As one court said, "It must be shown that [the
'79
person] has actually been dangerous in the recent past.
Because there is no case law elucidating the content of overt
dangerous behavior, it will be helpful to "invent" a body of case law
by testing the definition of overt dangerous behavior against a series
of hypothetical situations. The hypotheticals are organized to consider first the danger of harming others, then the danger of suicide
or self-injury, and finally the danger of being unable to care for
oneself. For the purposes of these hypothetical situations, assume
that Smith is resisting commitment and that a competent psychiatrist has determined that Smith is mentally ill and likely to be
dangerous.
Smith assaults his spouse with a butcher knife and wounds her.
This behavior clearly meets the definition because it endangers his
spouse. If Smith stabs at his spouse but misses, this attempt also
presents a risk of substantial harm. Suppose Smith believes the
butcher knife is a butter knife and thus cannot hurt his spouse. This
still constitutes overt dangerous behavior because Smith's spouse is
in fact endangered, no matter what Smith believes. Smith reveals
to a third person his elaborate plan to kill his spouse. This threat,
if objectively a serious one, also could support a finding of overt
dangerous behavior. In a fit of rage Smith smashes a platter on the
floor. Smith's spouse may fear that the next furious act will result
in harm to her, but Smith's behavior is not dangerous because by

substantial emotional injury or damage to property which constitutes a crime may provide a
basis for commitment. 1976 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 130, § 1. The basis of dangerousness to
property was held not to meet substantive due process. Suzuki v. Yuen, 46 U.S.L.W. 2181
(D. Hawaii Sept. 26, 1977) (the proper standard requires imminent and substantial danger
evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt, or threat).
11Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
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itself it presents no risk of physical harm to the spouse. Because a
psychiatrist has pronounced Smith mentally ill, this result may
seem troubling, but the overt dangerous behavior requirement has
not yet been met.
Smith slits his wrists. This behavior is within the definition
because it is an apparent suicide attempt. But suppose Smith declares his intent to kill himself. Whether this is dangerous behavior
depends on whether another person could reasonably regard Smith's
threats as serious. Smith is a chronic alcoholic and has a depressive
mental disorder. Although Smith is statistically a high suicide risk,
there is as yet no dangerous behavior, unless Smith's consumption
of alcohol is regarded as presenting a substantial risk of harm to
himself. Although the statutes and cases do not give much guidance, they seem to require a more proximate danger than alcohol
consumption presents.
Smith is catatonic. His behavior constitutes overt dangerous
behavior because it manifests his inability to care for his health or
safety. Smith is not catatonic, but he hasn't eaten in many days. If
this failure to eat is the result of neglect, the overt dangerous behavior standard is satisfied because Smith's conduct demonstrates his
inability to care for his health. What if Smith's fast is the result of
an intentional decision? Although a sane person may for his own
reasons fast without the conduct being regarded as dangerous,
Smith's mental illness colors his conduct considerably. It is difficult
to say whether this conduct is overt dangerous behavior. Smith
refuses medication. If the medication is needed to maintain his life
or prevent a debilitating condition, Smith's refusal is dangerous
behavior because it endangers his health. This conduct is like fasting in that the refusal to take medication might be the result of a
knowing and intentional decision, but the health threat is more
proximate. Smith is hyperactive and compulsively repeats one task.
A psychiatrist might predict that the mental disorder will ultimately be disabling, but the behavior does not meet the definition
because it does not show that Smith is currently unable to care for
himself.
These hypotheticals indicate that the generally adopted definition of overt dangerous behavior is adequate to settle some cases,
but leaves some troubling ambiguities that will have to be resolved
by further litigation or more specific legislation.
3. Is Dangerousness Required for Involuntary Civil
Commitment? Since the essential function of an overt dangerous
behavior requirement is to establish a minimum level of support for
a finding that a person is "dangerous," the importance of the requirement depends on whether and when a finding of dangerousness
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is itself a prerequisite to involuntary commitment. The Supreme
Court in Donaldson indicated that the Constitution required a finding of at least one of the "generally advanced" grounds for civil
commitment-a risk of harm to self or others, an inability to survive
safely in freedom, or the need for treatment to alleviate or cure a
disease. The Court refused to decide, however, whether any one of
these justifications by itself would be sufficient, or indeed whether
any two or even all three together would be sufficient."0
Several lower courts have gone beyond Donaldson by holding
that the Constitution always requires a finding of "dangerousness"
before involuntary civil commitment.8 ' As indicated above, the definition of "dangerousness" generally adopted by the lower courts
includes both the likelihood of physical harm to self or others and
the inability to survive safely in freedom (which may be viewed as
a form of risk of harm to self).s2 On the other hand, the generally
accepted definition of "dangerousness" does not include the need
for treatment. Therefore, by requiring proof of "dangerousness" in
all cases, these courts have in effect held that a need for treatment
3
is not an independent ground for commitment.1
The question whether the need for treatment by itself should
be a constitutionally acceptable ground for involuntary civil commitment merits further consideration because the answer could
have a significant impact on the number of cases where a finding of
"dangerousness" is constitutionally required. Donaldson indicates
that the answer should be determined by due process interest balancing, that is, by weighing the state's interest in commiting an
individual against the individual's interest in freedom.
The Supreme Court has suggested at least once that treatment
may be a sufficient ground for commitment. In Robinson v.
California4 the Court in dicta approved a program of compulsory
treatment for narcotics addicts that included periods of involuntary
confinement. 5 But the Robinson dictum does not establish a principle that treatment may in all cases justify commitment. The narcotics addict is unlike the nondangerous mentally ill person because
" For a discussion of a case where the Court has sustained the grounds relied on by the
government in committing a person, see notes 20 & 31 supra.
" See text and notes at notes 35-60 supra.
"2See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 n.9 (1975).
1 Of course, the consequences of nontreatment may be so severe that a person who
refuses treatment will be found "dangerous," but the ground for commitment in such a case
is "dangerousness," not the mere need for treatment.
" 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
Id. at 665.
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the narcotics addict threatens violation of the narcotics laws. Treatment and confinement may be justified in this context because the
state's interests are substantial. Further, the individual's narcotics
habit may threaten his own safety or survival. On the other hand,
the nondangerous mentally ill person by definition poses no risk of
harm to others or himself. Thus, the balance of interests could plausibly weigh in favor of the individual when the state's only interest
is in providing treatment. indeed, Chief Justice Burger, concurring
in Donaldson, expressly rejected "the theory that a State may lawfully confine an individual thought to need treatment and justify
that deprivation of liberty solely by providing some treatment,"
concluding that "[o]ur concepts of due process would not tolerate
such a 'trade-off.'

"86

Other factors, however, suggest that the need for treatment
should be sufficient to justify involuntary confinement of the mentally ill in at least some instances. Treatment is distinguishable
from simply improving an individual's living standard because
treatment seeks to remove the condition that allows intervention.
Treatment may be established as a limited intervention that will
cease when a cure is effected or when, at the end of a definite period,
no improvement is obtained.
The most difficult factor to weigh in the balance is the prospect
of curing or improving the mental illness. Drug treatments today
offer many patients the possibility of significant improvement."
The consequent infringement of liberty may last only a few weeks
or months. The balance is difficult to weigh, but the categorical
judgment that the benefit of treatment may never outweigh the
individual's liberty interest seems unwarranted. The remarkable
advances that have been made in drug therapy suggest not only that
involuntary treatment may sometimes be justified, but that the
possibility of further advances should not be foreclosed by legal
rules.8"
There is a significant possibility for abuse in allowing involuntary commitment solely on the basis of a psychiatric judgment that
a person needs treatment, but forbidding all commitments of nondangerous persons is not necessary in order to curb this abuse.
422 U.S. at 589 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
See generally Berger, Hamburg & Hamburg, Mental Health; Progressand Problems,
DAEDALUS,

Winter 1977, at 261.

n For a different weighing of this balance, see DuBose, Of the ParensPatriae Commitment Power and Drug Treatment of Schizophrenia: Do the Benefits to the PatientJustify
Involuntary Treatment? 60 MINN. L. Rav. 1149 (1976).
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Rather, commitment for treatment could be limited to situations
where abuse is unlikely. For example, it would be appropriate to
require that efficacious treatment be available, and that it be administered without confinement if possible. Further, since mental
disorders may range from severe to relatively innocuous, it would be
appropriate to recognize that at some point the mental illness is not
severe enough to warrant involuntary treatment. If the need-fortreatment rationale is limited in this fashion, it will not become a
"loophole" and the "dangerousness" rationale will remain important.
4. Overt Dangerous Behavior and Accurate Predictions of
FutureDangerous Behavior. A basic assumption underlying the rationales for an overt dangerous behavior requirement is that predictions that an individual will be dangerous in the future are more
accurate if based on specific instances of dangerous behavior in the
past by the same individual. A special concern for predictive accuracy in this context is understandable; involuntary commitment

imposes .a "massive curtailment of liberty"8 not for what a person
has done in the past, but for what he might do in the future if not
committed. Yet predictions of dangerousness are notoriously inaccurate.
The relevant studies have almost all focused on the prediction
of danger to others. 0 These studies reveal that dangerousness is
commonly overpredicted. The highest rate of accurate prediction of
future dangerous behavior has been approximately 35% 1-in other
words, only 35% of the persons labeled dangerous actually exhibited
dangerous behavior in the future. 2 Commentators have suggested
"Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
N Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 J.
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 371 (1972); Rubin, Predictionsof Dangerousness in Mentally Ill
Criminals, 27 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 397 (1972); Wenk, Robison & Smith, Can Violence Be
Predicted?, 18 J. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 393 (1972). See also Megargee, The Predictionof
Violence With Psychological Tests, in CURRENT Topics IN CLINICAL & COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY
(C. Spielberger ed. 1970). For good overviews of prediction of violence, see Monahan, The

Predictionof Violence, in VIOLENCE

AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

15 (D. Chappell & J. Monahan eds.

1975); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatryand the Presumptionof Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693 (1974). The release of nearly 1,000 mental patients following the Supreme Court's decision in Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), occasioned
several follow-up reports on prediction of dangerousness. See, e.g., Steadman & Keveles, The
Community Adjustment and CriminalActivity of the Baxtrom Patients-1966-1970,in 129
AM. J. PSYCH. 304 (1972).
" Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, supra note 90, at 390.
, It is important to recognize that erroneous predictions involve two types of errors. A
person can be falsely predicted to be dangerous (false positive prediction) or he can be falsely
predicted to be not dangerous (false negative prediction). Wilkins, The Case for Prediction,
in 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE 375 (L. Radzinowitz & M. Wolfgang eds. 1971). The empirical studies
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several reasons why predictions of danger to others are so inaccurate. First, the person predicting dangerousness is not likely to learn
of incorrect positive predictions since those persons determined to
be dangerous are typically confined.13 Many prediction makers may
consider the consequences of failing to incarcerate a dangerous person more serious than the consequences of incarcerating a nondangerous person. 4 Others may regard the requirement of a prediction
of dangerous behavior as simply an expedient to get someone to
treatment9 5 or may believe that in a close case it is better to treat
than to fail to treat for a problem. Most importantly, dangerous
behavior is rare conduct, and predicting the occurrence of rare con7
duct is very difficult.
Several studies have noted that predictions of dangerousness
that are based on overt dangerous behavior are more accurate than
other predictions. One study emphasized that "[t]he difficulty in
the prediction of dangerousness is immeasurably increased when
the subject has never actually performed an assaultive act."98 The
study concluded, "Given the present reality it is unlikely that dangerousness can be predicted in a person who has not acted in a
dangerous or violent way."99 Another study said flatly, "No one can
predict dangerous behavior in an individual with no history of acting out."'' 0 These studies suggest that an overt dangerous behavior
requirement will help ensure that fewer nondangerous persons are
committed, but no study has yet attempted to determine the actual
extent to which such a requirement would reduce false predictions
of dangerousness.
The prediction of dangerousness to self has not received equivalent empirical scrutiny. But, as with dangerousness to others, it is
probable that prediction based on overt dangerous behavior would
increase predictive accuracy. There is a common sense notion that
of prediction have focused on false positives to the exclusion of false negatives. Any attempt
to reduce the number of false positive predictions will increase the number of false negatives,
although because rare conduct is involved, the increase in false negatives will not be as large
as the decrease in false positive predictions.
13 Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways, TRIAL,
Feb./Mar. 1968, at 29, 33.
' Monahan, supra note 90, at 22-23.
's Rubin, supra note 90.
96 Ennis & Litwack, supra note 90, at 720-21.
9 Dewshowitz, The Law of Dangerousness:Some FictionsAbout Predictions, 23 J. LEG.
EDUC. 24, 46 (1970); Gottfredson, Assessment of Methods, 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE 343, 352 (L.
Radzinowicz & M. Wolfgang eds. 1971).
" Rubin, supra note 90, at 400.
, Id. at 405.
' Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, supra note 90, at 384.
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people will continue to behave as they have already behaved, and
an overt dangerous behavior requirement embodies this intuition.'"'
There is some reason to believe, however, that reliance on overt
dangerous behavior will be less helpful for predictions of dangerousness to self than for predictions of dangerousness to others. First,
dangerousness to self includes an inability to care for oneself. Compared to the assaultive conduct needed to show dangerousness to
others, the neglect or absent-mindedness needed to show an inability to care for oneself is probably more common behavior. An overt
dangerous behavior requirement may thus screen out fewer individuals falsely predicted to be dangerous to themselves. Second, overt
dangerous behavior may be significantly misleading as a predictor
of suicide. The relevant behavior is threatened or attempted suicide.
Yet not only do many successful suicides occur with no prior threats
or attempts, but many persons threaten or attempt suicide without
intending to kill themselves. 2
The relationship between overt dangerous behavior and predictions of dangerousness can thus be summarized as follows: there is
some evidence to support the common sense notion that predictions
based on past behavior are more accurate than other predictions, at
least where danger to others is involved, but there is as yet no
reliable estimate of how much better predictions based on past behavior are, and all predictions of dangerousness are more likely to
be incorrect than to be accurate.
B.

The Arguments in Favor of an Overt Dangerous Behavior
Requirement

The courts that have confronted the argument for an overt
dangerous behavior requirement have considered four distinct
"IOne commentator has relied on this common sense expectation in arguing for an overt
dangerous behavior requirement, see Ennis & Litwack, supra note 90, at 749: "One of the
most fundamental assumptions we make about life is that the future will be pretty much like
the past. People who have controlled their behavior in the past can probably be expected to
control their behavior in the future. Although this assumption is sometimes wrong, it is
correct often enough so that it affords a more rational basis for predicting dangerousness than
the present reliance on psychiatric judgments." Ennis has repeatedly advocated an overt
dangerous behavior requirement. See Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CRIM. L.
BULL. 101, 112 (1971); Ennis, Mental Illness, 1969-70 ANNUAL
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29,

46 (1970).
The National Institute for Mental Health's proposal for model legislation adopted an
overt dangerous behavior requirement in order to "give credence to the reasonable expectation that people who have restrained aggressiv or violent impulses in the past can be expected to continue to do so."
102

CENTER FOR STUDIES OF SUICIDE PREVENTION, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH,

SUICIDE PREVENTION IN THE

70s, at 91 (DHEW Pub. No. 72-9054, 1973).
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grounds for the requirement: sufficiency of the evidence, vagueness,
punishment for status, and due process interest balancing.
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence. The concept of sufficiency of
the evidence allows the judge to declare as a matter of law that the
evidence presented cannot support a certain factual conclusion. In
Lynch v. Baxley 0 3 the district court relied on the absence of sufficient evidence in holding that overt dangerous behavior was necessary to support an involuntary commitment. The sufficiency-of-theevidence analysis relies directly on the utility of overt dangerous
behavior in predicting future dangerous behavior. The court in
Lynch argued that without some behavior there is no direct evidence of dangerousness-only a "mere expectancy" based on opinion and conjecture, which "does not rise to the level of legal significance." 0 '
The sufficiency-of-the-evidence approach is appealing, particularly when a burden of proof greater than a preponderance is required for commitment.1 5 But this analysis does not reach constitutional dimensions. Indeed, the court in Lynch may have intended
the overt dangerous behavior requirement as a common law standard of dangerousness rather than a constitutional principle. Although the court invoked constitutional arguments elsewhere in its
"0

386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).

104Id.

"5Many courts and legislatures have viewed the preponderance burden of proof as inadequate to protect the individual's liberty interest, although courts have disagreed as to what
increased burden of proof is appropriate. Some courts have required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931, 936-37 (7th Cir. 1975);
In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1132
(D. Hawaii 1976); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1094-95 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated
and remanded for a more specific order, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on remand, 379 F. Supp.
1376 (1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated
on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976); cf. In re Pickles, 170 So. 2d 603, 612 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965) ("extreme care should be exercised in adjudicating one incompetent"). Other
courts have preferred to compromise between the preponderance and beyond a reasonable
doubt burdens of proof, generally requiring that the evidence be clear and convincing. Fippett
v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1158 (4th Cir. 1971); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439
(S.D. Iowa 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 516-17 (D. Neb. 1975); Bartley v.
Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1051-53 (E.D. Pa. 1975), remanded for reconsiderationof class
certification, 97 S. Ct. 1709 (1977); Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa.
1971); People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 325, 309 N.E.2d 733, 740-41 (1974); cf. United
States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (dictum) (defendant had been acquitted by
reason of insanity); In re Valdez, 540 P.2d 818 (N.M. 1975) (civil commitment of individual
found incapable to stand criminal trial); Fhagen v. Miller, 65 Misc. 2d 263, 317 N.Y.S.2d 128
(1970) ("civil standard" applies to requests for relief following emergency admission),
modified on other grounds, 36 App. Div. 2d 926, 321 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1971); State ex rel. Hawks
v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974) (emergency commitment). See generally Woodby v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 284-86 (1966) (deportation, although not
criminal, demands a higher standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence).
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opinion, in requiring an overt dangerous behavior standard the
court spoke simply of sufficiency of the evidence being a "legal
question." 0 '
2. Vagueness. The vagueness doctrine requires that conduct
that can lead to incarceration be described with reasonable specificity."°7 Although the doctrine is commonly applied to criminal proceedings, the underlying rationale of the doctrine is applicable to
civil commitment, which results in a similar deprivation of liberty.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the labeling of a
proceeding as civil or criminal does not control the applicability of
due process rights."8 The Court has accordingly applied the vagueness doctrine to noncriminal statutes on several occasions.100 Most
courts have agreed that the vagueness doctrine applies to civil commitment,1 and several courts that have required overt dangerous
behavior have considered the vagueness argument, at least in regard
to the constitutional basis of a dangerousness standard.'
The vagueness doctrine serves two primary purposes. First, a
statute must be definite in order to give fair notice -of what conduct
is forbidden.112 Second, a statute must give adequate guidance to
those who enforce it in order to prevent the risk of arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. 1 3 Clear statutory language also helps
386 F. Supp. at 391.
See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1964). See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960.).
"' In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967).
'" See, e.g., Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967)
(deportation for "affliction with a psychopathic personality"); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382
U.S. 399, 402 (1966) (assessment of court costs to acquitted defendants); Jordan v. DeGeorge,
341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951) (deportation for conviction of crime "involving moral turpitude" not
void for vagueness of standard).
"' Even the courts rejecting an overt dangerous behavior requirement have accepted that
the vagueness doctrine applies to involuntary civil commitment. See United States ex rel.
Mathew v. Nelson, No. 72-C-2104 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 1975); In re Salem, 228 S.E.2d 649, 65152 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (finding statute not unconstitutionally vague).
"I Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.
Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich.
1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded for a
more specific order, 414 U.S. 473, order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp.
1318 (1976); Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 155, 339 A.2d 764
(1975).
"2 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162-68 (1972); Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 458 (1927); Connally
v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255
U.S. 81, 89 (1921).
113Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168 (1972); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940). See also Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 285 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
'"
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provide for judicial review that can effectively regulate the adminis4
tration of the law.1
It could be urged that a commitment statute that does not
require overt dangerous behavior fails to give fair notice of what
conduct will result in a loss of liberty. This argument, however,
pushes the concept of fair notice beyond its logical bounds. The
individual is not committed because of his conduct, but rather because of his status as a mentally ill and dangerous person. The overt
behavior is merely evidence of this status. When a statute looks to
characteristics rather than conduct, the vagueness rationale does
5
not apply. In Boutilier v. Immigration & NaturalizationService
the Supreme Court considered a section of a statute excluding from
entry to the country any alien with a "psychopathic personality."
The Court said, "The section imposes neither regulation of nor sanction for conduct. In this situation, therefore, no necessity exists for
guidance so that one may avoid the applicability of the law." '
In contrast, the second purpose of the vagueness doctrine, the
avoidance of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, has potential application. Civil commitment determinations typically rely
heavily on psychiatric diagnosis and prediction, thus inviting arbi17
trary results because psychiatrists have a low rate of agreement.
A commitment statute that required overt dangerous behavior
would probably not be impermissibly vague. In Minnesota ex rel.
Pearsonv. Probate Court"' the Supreme Court examined a statute
that allowed involuntary confinement of dangerous sexual psychopaths. The state courts had construed that statute to require a
habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters."' This conduct
had to manifest the person's inability to control his behavior and
the likelihood that he would harm others. In light of this construction the court sustained the statute against a challenge of vagueness, emphasizing that ."the underlying conditions, calling for
"I Note, The Void-For-VaguenessDoctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67,
89 (1960).
387 U.S. 118 (1967).
Id. at 123.
", Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Predictionof Dangerousness:Flipping Coins in
the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693 (1974).
Psychiatrists may also be prone to bring personal biases into the determination, for
example by finding that blacks more than whites or men more than women are likely to be
violent. T. SzAsz, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS (1970); Rubin, Predictionof Dangerousness
in Mentally Ill Criminals, 27 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 397, 398 (1972). But see A. STONE, MErA
HEALTH AND THE LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 34-35 (1975).
" 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
"' Id. at 273.
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evidence of past conduct pointing to probable consequences are as
susceptible of proof as many of the criteria constantly applied in
prosecutions for crime." '2' Commitment statutes are closely analogous to the statute at issue in Pearson.Thus, Pearsonis a persuasive
precedent that a statute providing for commitment of dangerous
persons is not impermissibly vague if it requires evidence of overt
dangerous behavior.
Nevertheless, the vagueness argument only allows a court to
uphold a statute that requires overt dangerous behavior or, at most,
to read such a requirement into a statute in order to avoid finding
the statute unconstitutional. It does not mean that overt dangerous
behavior is constitutionally required, since other means could be
chosen to confine the otherwise unstructured judgments of psychiatrists and courts. For example, requiring psychiatrists to give detailed reasons for the determination of dangerousness, subject to
review for reasonableness, might reduce the incidence of arbitrary
or discriminatory commitment decisions. Similarly, a requirement
that some behavior, not necessarily dangerous in itself, must be
shown to support the classification of a person into a group with a
certain likelihood of dangerousness might help minimize arbitrary
or discriminatory commitment.
3. Punishment for Status. In Robinson v. California2 ' the
Supreme Court required criminal sanctions to be predicated on an
illegal act; otherwise the punishment is for status and is impermissible under the eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual
punishment. The Court in Robinson appeared to exclude civil confinement of the mentally ill from the scope of its holding:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would
attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be
mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a veneral disease.
A State might determine that the general health and welfare
require that the victims of these and other human afflictions
be dealt with by compulsory treatment involving quarantine,
confinement or sequestration.'2 2
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion similarly distinguished crimi"2

Id. at 274 (emphasis added).

121370 U.S. 660 (1960) (state statute making it a misdemeanor punishable by imprison-

ment to "be addicted to narcotics" held unconstitutional). See also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514, 532 (1968), (statute prohibiting appearing in a public place in a state of intoxication not
a punishment for status, as appearing drunk in public constitutes an act, unlike the status
of addiction in Robinson).
1" 370 U.S. at 666 (emphasis added).
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nal from noncriminal confinement: "The addict is a sick person. He
may of course be confined for treatment or for the protection of
society."' 23 Thus, Robinson is on its facts limited to criminal punishment for status, and the Court suggested in dictum that status may
properly be used as a criterion for other kinds of confinement.
Nonetheless, in Jackson v. Indiana the majority remarked, in
dictum, that "considering the number of persons affected by involuntary commitment of the mentally ill, it is perhaps remarkable
that the substantive constitutional limitations have not been more
frequently litigated, 1 '

24

citing Robinson and Powell v. Texas,

25

an-

other case dealing with punishment for status. Thus, the Court has
suggested, in a tantalizing but enigmatic fashion, that substantive
constitutional limitations on civil commitment could be based on
the punishment-for-status doctrine articulated in Robinson and
Powell. Donaldson was the first case to result in any substantive
constitutional limitation on the standards for civil commitment,
and the Court's narrow holding did not reach the punishment-forstatus issue.
Although some litigants have urged the applicability of the
punishment-for-status rationale, no court that has required overt
dangerous behavior has relied on this rationale.12 This reluctance
is understandable. Despite its similarity to criminal incarceration,
involuntary commitment is not punitive in purpose.1 21 More important, even if the doctrine were to apply to civil commitment, an

"IId. at 676.

I' 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972). Jackson involved a challenge of Indiana's statute which
allowed the civil commitment of accused persons who lacked the capacity to stand trial.
Persons committed under this statute were allowed substantially fewer procedural and substantive rights than those committed under provisions regarding the feeble-minded or insane
who had not been accused of crimes. The court found that this disparity was inconsistent with
equal protection and found the protections in the former statute inadequate to satisfy due
process.
1- 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
121In People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 324, 309 N.E.2d 733, (1974), the court
summarily rejected the punishment-for-status argument, distinguishing criminal incarceration from civil commitment involving treatment. The Illinois statute required treatment for
all involuntarily committed patients. The federal court in United States ex rel. Mathew v.
Nelson, No. 72-C-2104 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 18, 1975), also considered a punishment-for-status
challenge to the Illinois statute. The challenge was rejected on the basis that commitment
was based not on the status of mental illness, but rather on the reasonable expectation of
future dangerous behavior. This reasoning is unconvincing: dangerousness should be viewed
as a status because dangerousness, by itself, does not require any conduct. Thus, no court
has squarely considered and rejected a punishment-for-status analysis applied to statutes
where treatment is not required, and where the status character of dangerousness is acknowledged.
'I" For a further discussion of the inapplicability of the punishment-for-status doctrine
to civil commitment, see Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 6, at 1259-64.
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overt dangerous behavior requirement would not cure the objectionable nature of the commitment, because overt behavior is only evidentiary of the status of dangerousness, and commitment would
therefore still be based on status.
4. Due Process Interest Balancing. The most frequently invoked constitutional ground for an overt dangerous behavior requirement is the approach suggested in Donaldson-due process
interest balancing. Substantive due process demands that the
state's interest in confinement outweigh the individual's interest in
remaining at liberty in order to justify civil commitment. The implementation of this requirement demands a balancing
test-commitment should be allowed only when the magnitude of
the harm feared times the probability of its occurrence is greater
than the burden caused by the committed individual's loss of liberty.'1 The magnitude of harm gauges the type of danger that is
feared. The probability of the harm occurring gauges the degree of
risk. The deprivation of the individual's liberty is the burden imposed to prevent the harm's occurrence, and the burden increases
with the duration of the commitment. The factors are obviously not
susceptible to accurate quantification. Nonetheless, the balancing
test formulation focuses attention on the competing values at stake
in the commitment decision.
The three-judge court in Lessard v. Schmidt'2 employed a due
process analysis that imputed certain rough approximations of
weights to the variables. It regarded the individual's liberty interest
as "fundamental."' 3 0 In order to counterbalance a fundamental interest, the state's interest must be "compelling. 1 3' The court reasoned that the state's interest could not be compelling unless the
degree of risk was very high.
The argument for requiring overt dangerous behavior to assure
that the probability of future dangerous behavior is sufficiently high
focuses on the known unreliability of predictions of dangerous behavior. The argument urges that commitment should be permitted
only when prediction is most likely to be correct and that predictions based on overt dangerous behavior are the most accurate. This
argument is subject to two significant criticisms. First, the value of
' Cf. Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1100-03 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (suggesting a similar
balancing formula for commitments under an act governing sexual psychopaths).
' 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded for a more specific order,
414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976).
"' Id. at 1091.
131 Id.
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overt dangerous behavior in predicting danger to self rests only on
the reasonable expectation that people will behave as they have in
the past because no study has examined whether reliance on overt
behavior would increase predictive accuracy in this context. 32 Nor
is it clear that more correct prediction is needed for some categories
of dangerousness; for example, the danger of suicide or self-injury
can be predicted with significantly greater reliability than danger
to others. ,33 Second, the proper balancing of the competing interests
does not necessarily result in the balance effected by an overt dangerous behavior requirement. The proper balance might require a
greater likelihood of danger than current predictive skills can
achieve, even when based on overt dangerous behavior. 1 4 On the
other hand, the balance might require no greater likelihood of danger than prediction not based on overt dangerous behavior can
achieve, so the states could be left free to allow dangerousness to be
shown in a less accurate way.
CONCLUSION

The overt dangerous behavior requirement is one response to
the difficult problem of reconciling the liberty of the individual and
society's interest in controlling persons who are thought to present
a danger to themselves or others. Overt dangerous behavior offers
an appealing threshold condition for state interference with the liberty of persons who suffer from mental disabilities. It avoids the
controversies that surround the need for treatment as a ground for
commitment and reinforces the sadly inaccurate psychiatric predictions of dangerousness with a common sense support. Moreover,
commitments made on the ground of overt dangerous behavior resemble criminal convictions closely enough to relieve some of the
tension between the retribution-deterrence approach and the
prediction-prevention approach. Given these attractions, the interest of both legislatures and courts in the overt dangerous behavior
requirement is not surprising.
An option that is an attractive choice for a legislature, however,
may be less appealing as a constitutional mandate. Some lower
courts have been willing to deal in the abstract, building constitutional doctrine out of such general concepts as dangerousness, treat,31See text at notes 92-105 supra.
"I See text and notes at notes 101-102 supra.
"3 For example, the best predictions of dangerousness to others based on overt dangerous
behavior still identify two false positives for every true positive. See text and note at notes
91-92 supra.
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ment, and overt dangerous behavior. The rationales advanced by
these courts suggest that an overt dangerous behavior requirement
may be one way to meet some constitutional objections to present
standards for involuntary civil commitment but will not support the
broader propositions that such a requirement is always necessary or
sufficient to satisfy the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has followed a more cautious course. In an
area where generalizations mask extremely complex and difficult
issues, the Court has chosen a method of analysis-due process
interest balancing-that is inherently flexible and dynamic.13 5 The
Court has refused to judge the sufficiency or necessity of the generally advanced rationales for involuntary civil commitment. Instead
the Court has focused on the particular facts of extreme cases where
due process was conspicuously lacking, leaving the legislatures free
to experiment with and to develop various alternatives where the
balance of interests is closer and more controversial.
Reed Groethe
' See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715,
731-39 (1972). The Court has even more frequently employed an equal protection analysis in
cases involving challenges to the standards used for commitment. See note 20 supra. Equal
protection analysis allows the Court to limit its decision to a consideration of the proper
application of a state legislature's prior determination of what the standard for commitment
should be.

